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Administrative Law.  Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88 (R.I. 2020).  
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, the Rhode Island 
Superior Court has general subject-matter jurisdiction and 
equitable jurisdiction to hear appeals against state administrative 
agencies.  However, its judicial intervention is only appropriate to 
review a final order, with the sole exception for interlocutory orders 
being when review of the agency’s final order would be an 
inadequate remedy.  An order denying a motion to dismiss is not a 
final order and the exception for interlocutory orders requires 
showing that continuing the administrative process would be futile 
or would make the requested relief ineffective.  The appropriate 
remedy for an incomplete or deficient record is to either remand to 
the agency or order limited discovery. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On July 2, 2013, the Defendant, the Rhode Island Department 
of Health (the Department), through the Investigating Committee 
of its Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline, “made a finding of 
unprofessional conduct” against Mohammed Banki, M.D., D.M.D., 
and Frank Paletta M.D., D.M.D. (the Physicians).1  On December 
19, 2013, the Department made formal charges and scheduled an 
administrative hearing.2  However, the Physicians’ discovery was 
hindered by the Department’s failure to adequately comply with 
several of  the Physicians’ discovery requests, and so, on May 9, 
2014, a hearing officer entered a conditional order of dismissal 
against the Department unless it complied with the discovery 
requests by May 14, 2014.3  Although the Department gave 
responses for the discovery requests by the date ordered, on May 
21, 2014, the Physicians moved to dismiss, alleging that the 
1. Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88, 91 (R.I. 2020).  The Physicians are “both
medical doctors and dentists, but . . . their practice was primarily in the area 
of dentistry.”  Id. at 92 n.5. 
2. Id. at 92.
3. Id.
2021] SURVEY SECTION 805 
responses were inadequate.4  After a hearing, and another attempt 
by the Department to satisfy the discovery requests, the hearing 
officer denied the Physicians’ motion to dismiss in a written order 
(the Order), concluding that the Department had obeyed the 
conditional order.5 
Following the denial of their motion to dismiss by the hearing 
officer, the Physicians entered a complaint in Rhode Island 
Superior Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act,6 
arguing that the Order was final and as such, appealable.7  The 
Department argued that the complaint should be dismissed 
because the denial of the motion to dismiss was an interlocutory 
order and not a final order that is appealable under the statute.8  
The first hearing justice9 found that the Order was interlocutory in 
nature and thus not appealable without satisfying the elements of 
the exception provided in section 42-35-15(a) of the Rhode Island 
General Laws.10  Next, the hearing justice found that the 
Physicians failed to allege facts supporting why a future review of 
a final agency order would fail to provide an adequate remedy in 
the Physicians’ case.11  Finally, the hearing justice granted the 
Department’s motion to dismiss the Physicians’ complaint without 
prejudice to the Physicians’ seeking review after the Physicians had 
“exhausted their administrative remedies.”12 
After the Department’s motion to dismiss was granted, the 
Physicians petitioned for writ of certiorari with the Rhode Island 
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15.
7. Banki, 224 A.3d at 92.
8. Id.
9. In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court consolidated two matters
that were each heard by separate justices in the Rhode Island Superior Court 
who are referred to as the first hearing justice and the second hearing justice. 
Id. at 92 n.7. 
10. Id. at 92 (“[a]ny preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or
ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final 
agency order would not provide an adequate remedy” (quoting 42 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 42-35-15(a))). 
11. Id.
12. Id. (emphasis added).  The first hearing justice also ordered the De-
partment to “withdraw the sealed administrative record and to retain custody 
of it.”  Id. at 92–93. 
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Supreme Court.13  The Supreme Court granted certiorari but 
ordered that the case remain in Superior Court with a direction to 
find (1) whether the Department complied with the conditional 
dismissal order of May 9, 2014 and if not, (2) whether the 
conditional dismissal order was self-executing.14  The second 
hearing justice ordered that the Department provide the original 
administrative record by July 26, 2016.15  As a result of the 
Department’s failure to produce that record, the hearing justice 
entered a conditional order of dismissal unless the record was 
produced by August 3, 2016.16   
On August 3, 2016, the Department notified the hearing justice 
that the original administrative record had been lost and the 
Department instead submitted an amended hearing record.17  The 
hearing justice did not accept this amended hearing record and 
“ruled that what had been submitted was not the certified 
administrative record of the appeal.”18  Consequentially, the 
hearing justice: (1) granted the Physicians’ motion to enter default 
judgment against the Department, (2) denied the Department’s 
motion to vacate the default judgment, and (3) dismissed the 
Board’s original charges against the Physicians.19  At this stage of 
the litigation, the Department also petitioned the Supreme Court 
for certiorari, which the Court granted.20 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In this case, the parties each sought review of separate 
Superior Court rulings.21  The Supreme Court conducted a de novo 
review limited to questions of law regarding the first hearing 
justice’s order granting the Department’s motion to dismiss the 
Physicians’ administrative appeal, and the second hearing justice’s 




17. Id.  The Department’s amended hearing record was a “certified admin-




21. Id. at 94.
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entry of default judgment against the Department.22  To begin, the 
Court found that the first hearing justice incorrectly analyzed the 
Physicians’ failure to meet the requirements of section 42-35-15(a) 
as a jurisdictional issue rather than as a failure to state a claim, so 
the Court found it necessary to clarify the law governing 
administrative appeals.23  The Court explained that the Superior 
Court of Rhode Island has general subject-matter jurisdiction and 
equitable jurisdiction in the context of administrative appeals, and 
therefore, the issue in this case was not whether the Superior Court 
had subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather, if judicial intervention 
under the facts of the case was proper.24  The Court determined 
that the Superior Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction in this 
case.25   
To answer whether judicial intervention was appropriate 
under the facts of this case, the Court reasoned that judicial 
intervention by the Superior Court would be appropriate in two 
circumstances: (1) to review a final order issued by an agency in a 
case where the party adverse to the agency has “exhausted all 
administrative remedies available” and (2) to review “[a]ny 
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling . . . in 
any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide 
an adequate remedy.”26   
First, regarding the issue of whether the Order was a final 
order, the Court reasoned that a denial of a motion to dismiss is an 
interlocutory order because it does not “determine[ ] the rights or 
obligations of the parties” but “establishes only that the case will 
proceed to a hearing on the merits.”27  Therefore, the Court held 
22. Id. at 93.
23. Id. at 94–95.
24. Id. at 95 (citing Chase v. Bouchard, 671 A.2d 794, 796 (R.I. 1996); La
Petite Auberge, Inc. v. R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 279 (R.I. 
1980)). 
25. Id.
26. Id. at 95–96 (quoting 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(a) (alteration and
second omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Additionally, 
the Court did not take up the issue of whether the Superior Court had equita-
ble jurisdiction over the case because the Physicians did not “invoke” the Su-
perior Court’s equitable jurisdiction in this case.  Id. 
27. Id. at 96 (citing Fayle v. Traudt, 813 A.2d 58, 61 (R.I. 2003)).  The Court
also cited to the two-part test used by the United States Supreme Court to 
determine when an agency order is a “final order” in the context of the 
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that the Order was an interlocutory order, and not a final order.28  
Finding that circumstance one was not present in this case, the 
Court proceeded in its analysis to determine if circumstance two 
was present.  
Second, regarding the issue of whether the Order met the 
exception to the bar on interlocutory appeal because a review of the 
agency’s final order would be an inadequate remedy, the Court first 
addressed the Physicians’ argument that continuing the 
administrative process with inadequate discovery would render 
review of the Order “futile.”29  The Court reasoned that the 
Physicians failed to show how proceeding with inadequate 
discovery would render as futile a future appellate review of the 
Department’s final order.30  The Court also noted that the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which is “analogous” to Rhode Island’s admin-
istrative procedures.  Id.  The test asks (1) whether the order is the “consum-
mation” of the administrative agency’s process for making a decision and (2) 
whether the order determined the parties’ “rights and obligations.”  Id. (quot-
ing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
28. Id. at 96.  Additionally, in response to the Physicians’ argument that
an “interlocutory order” can be a “final order,” the Court pointed out that for 
an order to be “final” it “must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory na-
ture.”  Id. (quoting Bennett 520 U.S. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The Court further clarified that section 42-35-12 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws merely provides the requirements that must accompany a “final order” 
but does not provide a legal definition for the term in response to the Physi-
cians’ argument that the section did provide such a definition and that the Or-
der included all of the elements required by the section.  Id. at 96–97; see also 
42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-12 (requiring that final orders “be in writing,” con-
tain “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and requiring that adverse par-
ties “be notified either personally or by mail and be given “separate notice” 
regarding “the appeal period and the procedure for filing an appeal”). 
29. Id. at 97.  The Court noted that “review of an interlocutory order is
appropriate only where further agency review ‘would be futile or would destroy 
the effectiveness of the relief sought.’”  Id. (quoting Almeida v. Plasters’ & Ce-
ment Masons’ Local 40 Pension Fund, 722 A.2d 257, 259 (R.I. 1998) (alteration 
in original)).  The Court also noted that this is the standard governing when a 
court may review a final order before all administrative remedies have been 
exhausted, but the Physicians did not dispute the use of this standard before 
the first hearing justice.  Id. 
30. Id. at 97–98.  The Court also pointed out that interlocutory orders may
be reviewed as part of the review of a final order.  Id. at 97 (citing Greensleeves, 
Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 291 (R.I. 2007)).  Therefore, if the Physicians were 
to lose on the merits, they would be able to appeal prior interlocutory orders 
they were aggrieved by, i.e., the Order denying the Physicians’ motion to dis-
miss.  See id. 
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Physicians may yet prevail in administrative proceedings against 
the Department over the merits of the underlying charges—despite 
their purported lack of adequate discovery.31  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that in this case judicial intervention by the Superior 
Court was inappropriate, affirming the first hearing justice’s 
decision granting the Department’s motion to dismiss the 
Physicians’ administrative appeal.32 
Finally, the court proceeded in its analysis to consider the 
Department’s argument that the second hearing justice went 
beyond his discretion by entering default judgment against the 
Department.33  Agreeing with the Department, the Court stated 
that “lower courts . . . may not exceed the scope of the remand or 
open up the proceeding to legal issues beyond the remand.”34  The 
case was already remanded back to the Superior Court solely to 
answer whether the Department complied with the May 9, 2014, 
conditional order and whether that order was self-executing.35  
However, the Court reasoned that entry of default judgment 
against the Department was inappropriate to remedy the lost 
administrative record because the second hearing justice should 
have transmitted the case back to the Supreme Court without 
resolving the issue or should have resolved the issue based on the 
record he had.36  In any event, the Court indicated that ordering 
remand to the agency or ordering limited discovery would be the 
appropriate remedy to cure an incomplete or deficient 
administrative record.37  Furthermore, the Court found that the 
Physicians did not demonstrate the required showing that the 
record was incomplete, but merely speculated that it was 
incomplete because the index did not match the amended hearing 
record.38  Therefore, the Court quashed the second hearing justice’s 
31. Id. at 97–98.
32. Id. at 98.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting State v. Arciliares, 194 A.3d 1159, 1162 (R.I. 2018) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
35. Id. at 100.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 98–99.
38. Id. at 100.  The Court noted that the real issue was not whether the
Department could provide the “original” record, but rather it was whether the 
amended hearing record that the Department provided was “complete.”  Id.  
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entry of default judgment against the Department and remanded 
the case to the Superior Court specifically instructing that court to 
remand the case to the Rhode Island Department of Health to carry 
on with its hearing on the merits of the administrative charges 
against the Physicians.39 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court laconically commented about 
the age of this case and the delays it has faced while also 
acknowledging a lack of any substantive developments regarding 
the underlying charges.40  In its rationale, the Court made a twin 
effort to reduce confusion and ensuing delays regarding 
administrative appeals at the Superior Court level, and also to 
balance the interests and rights of the litigants appealing orders of 
state administrative agencies against the deference given to those 
administrative agencies and the hearing records they produce. In 
so doing, the Court identified four major points of law regarding 
administrative procedure to elucidate in this case.41   
To start, the Court acknowledged the need to clarify for the 
lower courts that the Rhode Island Superior Court indeed has 
jurisdiction over administrative appeals against state agencies and 
that determining whether such an administrative appeal states a 
claim upon which relief can be granted hinges on whether the 
court’s judicial intervention is appropriate based on the facts of the 
case.42  By eliminating any confusion in the lower courts, this ruling 
helps prevent the error from recurring and thus helps prevent 
unnecessary litigation or delays in the form of appealing the 
error.43 
The Court also noted that the Physicians did not allege that any particular 
“relevant document[s] w[ere] missing” from the amended hearing record and 
that they if they had done so, “then the second hearing justice could have or-
dered limited discovery or a remand to the [D]epartment to locate or provide 
the missing documents.”  Id.  
39. Id. at 100–01.  Wryly commenting that the age of this “hoary” case was
“approaching seven years” without hearing anything “substantive” regarding 
the underlying charges against the Physicians, the Court underscored the need 
to finish the administrative process “without further delay.”  Id. at 101. 
40. Id. at 100.
41. See id. at 94–100.
42. Id. at 94–95.
43. See id.
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Next, the Court explained that an order denying a motion to 
dismiss is an interlocutory order and thus not a final order that can 
be appealed.44  Without suggesting anything untoward about the 
Physicians’ intent regarding their appeals, the Court’s ruling 
effectively prevents similar appeals and ensuing delays in future 
cases by rendering as frivolous the argument that a motion to 
dismiss is a final order.45 
Then, the Court made clear that the exception allowing review 
of an interlocutory order requires showing futility in that 
proceeding further with the agency would make the sought-after 
remedy ineffective.46  This so-called finality rule prevents 
premature review of intermediate orders while cases are still 
developing at the administrative level to prevent delays, to prevent 
flooding the courts with administrative litigation at a preliminary 
stage, and to prevent wasting judicial resources on determining 
preliminary issues that could have been “resolved or become moot 
. . . at the administrative level.”47   
Finally, with respect to incomplete or deficient administrative 
hearing records, the Court highlighted that entering default 
judgment against an agency is an inadequate remedy to correct an 
incomplete record and explained that the appropriate remedy in 
that case is to order remand to the agency or to order limited 
discovery.48  Although the Court sympathized with the Superior 
Court’s difficulty in correcting the lost administrative record, it 
admonished the second hearing justice for exceeding his discretion 
in this case.49  The Court expounded that curing an incomplete 
administrative record by remanding to the agency allows both 
adverse parties to participate in further hearings to develop the 
44. Id. at 96.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 96–98.
47. See id. at 98 (quoting N. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Wagner, 176 A.3d
1097, 1099 n.3 (R.I. 2018)). 
48. Id. at 98–99.  The Court noted that it could not locate “any caselaw,
either in our own or federal jurisprudence, where an agency has been subject 
to a default judgment for having lost the original administrative record.”  Id.  
Regarding limited discovery, the Court noted that it is appropriate when there 
is a showing that a particular relevant document or piece of information was 
missing, which there was not, in this case.  Id. at 99-100. 
49. Id. at 98–99.
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facts, balancing the competing rights and interests of 
administrative agencies against their adverse litigants.50  In sum, 
the Court, looking to its own relevant case law and to analogous 
on-point federal case law, took a balanced approach considering 
society’s interest in functioning administrative agencies, as well as 
the rights and interests of those agencies’ adverse litigants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the first hearing 
justice, holding that the Order denying the Physicians’ motion to 
dismiss was not a final order and holding that review of the Order 
as an interlocutory order was inappropriate because it could be 
reviewed after the Department issues its final order.  Determining 
that entry of default judgment against the Department was in 
excess of the Superior Court’s discretion, the Supreme Court 
quashed the second hearing justice’s order and remanded the case 
to Superior Court, instructing that court to remand the case to the 
Rhode Island Department of Health for further administrative 
proceedings. 
 Richard Tavares 
50. See id. at 99 (quoting Lemoine v. Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation
and Hospitals, 320 A.2 611, 614 (R.I. 1974)). 
